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Abstract 
 
One measure of whether the candidate countries in Central Europe should join the euro is the 
degree of real exchange rate variability they are experiencing at present.  If it is high one could 
argue that they ‘need’ still some exchange rate flexibility to absorb asymmetric shocks.  Our 
results suggest that the still remaining variability of real exchange rates in Central Europe 
might be mostly due to the fact that nominal exchange rates are still a source of shocks.  The 
candidate countries have already now a lower degree of exchange rate variability (after taking 
into account the different degree of nominal variability) than the ‘Club Med’ countries during 
the early 1990.  Moreover, the traditional OCA criteria, e.g. trade structure, do not seem to be 
related to real exchange rate variability.  This reinforces the argument that there is little 
concrete evidence that the candidate countries would need to undergo a lengthy period of real 
convergence before they should join the euro. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After the successful launch in 1999 and the first ‘enlargement’ in 2000, the eurozone is slowly 
but steadily getting prepared for further expansion. Ten advanced candidate countries are 
heading for EU membership in 2004. Once they fulfil the Maastricht convergence criteria they 
are expected to adopt the euro. The exact timing of this far-reaching step is very unclear, 
though. So far it only appears to be certain that the candidates will be required to stay in the 
ERM II for a period of at least two years before they are allowed to join the ‘euro club’. 
However, neither the entry into the ERM II has to materialise upon the assumption of the EU 
membership nor the stay in the system is limited by the two-year period. Therefore, the 
candidate countries are very little restricted in choosing the way and time of their adoption of 
the euro. This, of course, raises a question of optimality of such a transition. 
 
Despite the fact that the Maastricht criteria, the only official conditions for the euro area entry, 
are preoccupied with convergence of nominal macroeconomic indicators, the question of 
balance between the costs and benefits of a monetary union membership hinges, above all, on 
the degree and development of real convergence between the countries sharing or willing to 
share a common currency. The recent macroeconomic developments in the candidate countries 
indicate that most of them should be capable of satisfying the nominal convergence criteria in a 
relatively short time period (Gros et al. (2002)). The question of real convergence seems to be 
much less clear-cut. The conventional view goes that the candidates are still too poor and 
different to be able to share currency and monetary policy with the current EU members. 
However, the successful integration of the ‘periphery’ economies into the eurozone has 
indicated that some of the concerns might be overstated. 
 
It is thus obvious that one would need a comprehensive theoretical framework in order to be 
able to arrive at a reliable assessment of the transition to the euro. It might appear that the 
Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory is what we are looking for. At least its name and 
popularity support its ambition to become the decisive tool in deciding about further steps 
towards monetary integration. Unfortunately, this is not exactly the case as the OCA theory is 
inherently very difficult to operationalise. First, is it very contentious to determine what values 
of indicators suggested by the OCA theory are still acceptable if candidate countries intend to 
join the eurozone. Second, empirical research has provided very mixed results which are 
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uneasy to interpret. With these reservations in mind, we want to explore variability of real 
exchange rates of the candidate countries as an OCA indicator. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: the next section provides a short overview of the 
OCA theory and the most commonly used OCA indicators. Then, it offers some empirical 
evidence on the conventional OCA indicators for the candidate countries. The third section 
describes the methodology and data used for computation of the exchange rate variability 
indicator and supplies the empirical results. Section four concludes. 
 
2. Optimum Currency Areas and the CEE Candidates: The standard approach 
 
As already mentioned, the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) theory attempts to offer a 
comprehensive approach for assessment of the balance between costs and benefits of giving up 
flexible exchange rates and embarking on monetary integration projects. 
 
The traditional OCA approach is based on the standard line of reasoning in support of 
exchange-rate flexibility: if a shock reduces the demand for the exports of a country, a real 
depreciation is required to maintain full employment and external equilibrium. The required 
real depreciation could also be achieved by a reduction in nominal ('money') wages, but this 
takes time and can presumably be achieved only through a period of substantial 
unemployment. The proper exchange-rate policy could thus reduce, and possibly even 
eliminate, the unemployment problems that arise from 'asymmetric shocks'. Asymmetric 
shocks, it is often argued, will invariably ratchet up unemployment. 
 
Therefore, Robert Mundell (1961) put the crucial point of his pioneering contribution as 
follows: 'A system of flexible exchange rates is usually presented, by its proponents, as a 
device whereby depreciation can take the place of unemployment when the external balance is 
in deficit, and appreciation can replace inflation when it is in surplus'. (p. 657) Most economists 
continue to accept the general idea behind this approach, namely that nominal wages are usually 
sticky in the short-run and that it is therefore easier to adjust to external shocks and obtain changes 
in the real exchange rate or the terms of trade through a movement in the nominal exchange rate. 
Consequently, an optimum currency area should comprise of countries/regions that are highly 
coherent, structurally similar and with high inter-regional factor mobility. Under such 
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circumstances asymmetric shocks are unlikely to occur or the adjustment can be easily achieved 
through channels other than nominal exchange rates.  
 
Therefore, the research in the OCA field has become a quest for identifying characteristics that 
the countries/regions willing to proceed with monetary unification should have in order to 
minimise the costs of losing the exchange rate adjustment tool and independent monetary 
policy (for comprehensive overviews see Horvath (2001), de Grauwe (1997)). In the last 40 
years, the OCA theory has grown to include a number of such indicators. The list of original 
characteristics stressing the importance of labour mobility, trade openness and trade 
diversification (Mundell, 1961, McKinnon, 1963 and Kenen, 1969) has been further extended 
and includes, for example, mobility of capital, degree of fiscal integration, similarity of 
inflation rates, co-movement of business cycles, indicators of structural similarity. 
 
From this follows that economic studies do not usually attempt to test the OCA reasoning 
directly. Most of them just analyse the degree to which various macroeconomic indicators 
(output, trade structure, the real exchange rate, unemployment etc.) are correlated across 
countries. A finding that these correlations are low (they are seldom negative) is then usually 
interpreted as implying that the countries concerned are subject to important asymmetric 
shocks. 
 
3. The OCA, EMU and enlargement 
 
There was an upsurge of empirically oriented contributions trying to employ the OCA 
indicators at the beginning of 90s when the project of European monetary integration was 
getting its final shape. Already at that time, researchers encountered the problem of setting a 
benchmark for determining which values of the OCA indicators are still acceptable and which 
would indicate serious troubles if countries ignored the warning and formed a monetary union. 
Given the size of the EU countries and their level of development it was only natural to 
compare them with the U.S. And the results of such a comparison seemed in most cases 
straightforward: EU countries are not coherent enough to form a monetary union. First years of 
existence of the EMU have, nevertheless, shown that differences among the member countries 
have not caused any significant tensions.  
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There are at least two conceptual arguments that can be used to oppose these pessimistic 
conclusions. First, as Frankel and Rose (1998) demonstrated, some of the OCA indicators are 
endogenous and are likely to align once the countries make the first steps towards the monetary 
integration. Second, some of the economic characteristics captured by the OCA indicators may 
substitute for the others. For example, even in the absence of labour mobility adjustment can be 
achieved with help of mobility of capital. Therefore, a country does not necessarily need to 
fulfil all the OCA tests in order to be considered to be suitable for the euro. 
 
The progress in the EU accession negotiations with the CEEC candidate countries has also 
initiated intensive research as to whether the candidate countries are similar enough to the 
current euro area members and thus ripe for the euro. And the history is repeating itself. Again, 
the OCA approach was taken use of and a whole host of analysis previously done in the case of 
the then euro candidates was applied to the case of the candidate countries. Given the still 
considerable differences between the candidate countries and the current EU members it is not 
surprising that most of the authors expressed, at least, significant caution if not straight 
scepticism about candidates’ preparedness for the euro. 
 
It is usually assumed to be beyond dispute that the candidates for EU membership from Central 
and Eastern Europe have a different economic structure. The key fact most often cited in this 
context is that their GDP per capita is only a fraction of the EU-15 average, and much lower 
than the poorest present member countries. This fact, plus a number of structural indicators, 
such as the importance of employment in agriculture is usually taken as an indicator that 
CEECs are more likely to be affected by asymmetric economic shocks than most EU-15 
countries. 
 
However, it is not certain how poor one has to be in order to be unable to share a currency with 
a richer neighbour. The Club Med countries which had usually been considered as the 
European periphery were apparently ‘above’ the magical threshold. Are the candidates, or 
some of them above the threshold as well? Some of the economic characteristics of the 
candidates have already aligned with their EU counterparts. Therefore, the final assessment of 
balance between costs and benefits of joining the euro area is often a result of personal 
preferences concerning the importance of various indicators. 
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In order to demonstrate the controversy of the OCA approach in relation to the CEE candidate 
countries we provide empirical evidence on several standard OCA indicators. 
 
The following six indicators from the optimum-currency-area approach are used: 
 
1) Intra-industry trade. An indicator of the extent to which two countries exchange similar 
goods, the higher this indicator the lower should be the likelihood that trade is affected by 
asymmetric shocks.  Technically we use the Grubel-Lloyd index on the basis of the 2-digit 
CN-level of trade structures. This index is calculated as one   minus the sum of the absolute 
value of net exports of each CN 2-digit sector over the sum of total exports and imports 
(2000 data). 
2) Trade structure similarity. The measure used here is the correlation coefficient between the 
shares of about 100 products (at the 2-digit CN-level) in overall intra-European exports and 
in the exports of each EU member to other EU members (2000 data). 
3) Real GDP growth correlation: Correlation coefficient between real GDP growth in EU12 
and the respective country from 1993/4-2000. 
4) Industrial growth correlation: Same method as above.   
5) Unemployment rate (changes) correlation: Correlation coefficient between the 
unemployment rate of EU12 and candidate countries, 1994-2001. 
6) Exports to EU15 as a percentage of GDP (2000). 
 
The first two indicators capture the differences in economic structures that are supposed to 
measure the potential for asymmetric shocks.  Indicators 3 to 5 measure the extent to which the 
economies of individual countries have tended to move together with the EU average over the 
observed period. The last indicator measures the importance of trade with the rest of the EU 
and is, thus, a measure of the expected benefits from EMU. 
 
The candidate countries have achieved significant progress in terms of structural convergence 
(see Table 1). Both, trade structure and intra-industry trade indicators in most cases approach 
the levels typical for the current EMU members. Rather high level of specialisation is 
characteristic for the Baltic countries. It might be their small economic size that contributes to 
the extremely low values of the indicators. They have no choice but to specialise in a limited 
number of industries. It is mainly in the case of  these very small economies that there exists a 
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high potential for being affected by asymmetric shocks (but their high degree of openness 
might still make them interested in joining a large currency area). 
 
Table 1: The traditional OCA indicators 
 Intra-
industry 
trade 
Trade 
structure 
similarity 
Real GDP 
growth 
correlation
Industrial 
growth 
correlation
Unemploy-
ment rate 
correlation
Exports to 
EU15 
CR 74 92 7 30 -20 39 
Estonia 56 51 14 44 -19 58 
Hungary 76 91 89 75 -30 43 
Poland 59 84 16 16 -58 13 
Slovenia 72 86 39 82 40 32 
Latvia 22 10 30 29 28 24 
Lithuania 36 27 -4 -12 -61 18 
SR 68 88 14 72 -30 33 
Average 58 66 26 42 -19 33 
Germany 95 77 68 90 85 14 
Greece 22 26 64 56 64 5 
Source: own calculations based on AMECO data. 
 
 
The indicators of business cycle co-movement give a somewhat different picture as the 
candidates score rather poorly on this account with the correlation coefficients rather low for 
the growth rates of industrial production and output.  And in the case of changes in 
unemployment rate the average correlation coefficient is even slightly negative. However, one 
could argue in line with Frankel and Rose (1998) that countries like the CEE candidates would 
not satisfy the OCA criterion of a high correlation with the core countries as long as they 
stayed outside, but that they would satisfy this criterion once they had been inside EMU for 
some time since the business cycle co-movements are endogenous. Moreover, the business 
cycle indicators have been heavily influenced by the fact that the candidates have undergone 
the process of transition. The value of exports to the EU countries as a percentage of the GDP 
is high pointing to the fact that the candidate countries are strongly tied to the EU market and 
would thus significantly benefit from joining the euro area.  
 
Therefore, it is not easy to conclude, at least on the basis of the traditional OCA approach, 
whether the candidate countries could safely aspire for EMU membership. 
 
4. A different approach 
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Given the limitations of the standard indicators shown above we attempt to extend the analysis 
and look at the degree of real exchange rate variability of candidate countries’ currencies as a 
more informative OCA criterion. The rationale of using this criterion is as follows: when we 
observe that the real exchange rate between two currencies is stable, it could be argued that in 
these two countries there were not many (asymmetric) shocks that required real exchange rate 
changes. Therefore, for these two countries the cost of forming a monetary union (and thus 
losing nominal exchange rate flexibility) is small (see for example De Grauwe and H. Heens, 
1991) 
 
The variability of the exchange rates might seem to be the most straightforward and aggregate 
way of looking at suitability of a country for joining a monetary union. The other variables 
focus either on the availability or efficiency of adjustment mechanisms (factor mobility, fiscal 
federalism) or on the potential for asymmetric shocks (structural similarity, trade 
diversification, business cycle co-movements). The real exchange rate variability indicates to 
what extent the country is actually being affected by asymmetric shocks, or rather to what 
extent real exchange rates react in order to cushion such shocks. 
 
Vaubel (1976 and 1978) considered the real exchange rate variability criterion as a crucial one 
for determining the currency area optimality since, as he claimed, the real exchange rates are 
clearly measurable and automatically give the appropriate weights to underlying economic 
fundamentals. However, Bofinger (1994) notes not all the movements in the real exchange 
rates are attributable to asymmetric shocks. Despite the fact that the criterion should be 
complemented with other ones (some of which were mentioned in the preceding section) in 
order to gain a more complex assessment of country’s suitability for a currency union it still 
provides some essential information. 
 
In this perspective it is interesting to look at the variability of the candidate countries.  If it is 
high one could argue that they ‘need’ nominal exchange rate flexibility, at least at present, but 
also potentially in future as well. 
 
5. Methodology and data 
 
 
10
In the following analysis we focus on the eight advanced candidate countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe which have been identified by the recent Brussels’ European Council summit 
as capable of finalising the accession negotiations by the end of 2002. These are the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The two other 
CEE candidates – Bulgaria and Romania – are still somewhat lacking behind despite the fact 
that especially Bulgaria has managed to make important progress towards macroeconomic 
stability and advancing economic reforms. For these countries a high real exchange rate 
variability does not necessarily signal an adjustment need of the real sector, but rather weak 
macroeconomic management. Therefore, we leave countries with close to hyperinflation aside 
(Romania and Bulgaria until 1997). The experience of the Club Med countries (Greece, Italy, 
Spain and Portugal) before they joined the euro will constitute the benchmark.  
 
We calculate the real bilateral exchange rates from the equation: 
 
CPI
CPIERER
*⋅=  
 
Where E is the nominal exchange rate of the currency of the country in question vis-à-vis DEM 
or the euro, CPI* and CPI are the consumer price indexes in the reference country 
(Germany/euro area) and the home country respectively. The real exchange rates of the 
candidate countries are computed vis-à-vis the euro (for the period 1996-1998, vis-à-vis ECU). 
In the case of the Club Med countries, the DM is used as the standard because they were 
members of the DM dominated EMS. 
 
We calculate the monthly real exchange rate using the monthly nominal exchange rates vis-à-
vis ECU/euro and DEM and of the monthly CPI over the period 1996-2001 for the CEEC8 and 
the monthly CPI over 1990-1995 for the Club Med countries. The data are taken from the 
Eurostat and International Financial Statistics of the IMF. 
 
We measure the variability each year by the standard deviation of 12 monthly changes in the 
natural logarithm of the bilateral (real and nominal) exchange rates. We used the same 
methodology to measure the variability of the relative CPI. In the case of the candidate 
countries, the variability measures were computed for the sub-periods of 1996-1998 and 1999-
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2001, which are compared with the ones of the Club Med currencies in the early 1990s. We 
present two different data sets for the Club Med: one based on the calm period 1990-92, and 
one for the turbulent years namely 1993-5, which turned out just to precede the decision to join 
EMU. 
 
Table 2: Variability of the bilateral real exchange rates in CEEC-8 and Club Med countries 
(measured by standard deviation) 
CEEC-8 Club Med 
Average Average Average Average 
 
1996-1998 1999-2001 1990-1992 1993-1995 
Monthly data  
Variation of RER 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.2 
Variation of NER 1.2 1.3 1.5 2.1 
Variation of relative 
CPI 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.7 
Quarterly data ( normalised to a monthly rate) 
Variation of RER 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.4 
Variation of NER 0.6 0.6 1.1 1.3 
Variation of relative 
CPI 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.3 
 
The resulting numbers (see Table 2 and for more detailed data Appendix) are astonishing: the 
variability of the both real and nominal exchange rate is, on average, of the same magnitude for 
the CEEC8 as for the Club Med in the early 1990s.1 This means that the candidates with only 
moderate inflation rates have already now achieved a level of real and even nominal exchange 
rate variability that is almost the same as that of the Club Med countries during the early 1990s, 
i.e. before the ERM crisis. 
 
Table 2 shows that for all country groups real exchange rate variability is slightly higher than 
nominal variability. This implies that exchange rates have typically not moved to offset 
inflation differentials, but on the contrary, have tended to move in the opposite direction. This 
would suggest that in reality exchange rates constitute a source of shocks rather than shock 
absorbers (see Gros and Thygesen 1998). 
 
                                                 
1 The detailed data in the Appendix show that this conclusion holds also if one considers weighted averages or, in 
general, looks at the individual countries. 
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Figure 1: Bilateral exchange rate variability (CEEC8 and Club-Med)
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We normalised the quarterly variability measures to a monthly rate, in order to make them 
comparable. Not surprisingly, Table 2 also shows that variability is somewhat lower if one 
looks at changes over quarters. 
 
It is also apparent from these data that the variability of the relative price levels is much lower 
than that of either nominal or real exchange rates. Real exchange rate variability is then 
dominated by nominal exchange rate variability. This is a well-known phenomenon, which can 
be seen clearly in Figure 1.  
 
The average degree of real exchange variability is the same for the CEEC-8, but do they show 
higher degree of real variability for a given level of nominal variability? If this were indeed the 
case, one would have to recognise that the candidates are still in need for nominal exchange 
rate flexibility. 
 
The relationship between real and nominal exchange rate variability that is visually apparent in 
Figure 1 can also be captured by a cross-section regression equation. The regression result is: 
 
812.090.044.0 CEECdummynerrer −+=  
         (20.66)     (-1,73)  
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 where rer is the standard deviation of the monthly changes in the natural logarithm of the 
bilateral real exchange rate, ner is the standard deviation of the monthly change in natural 
logarithm of the nominal exchange rate in the EU countries (averaged over the three years 
1990-92 and the for CEECs over the period 1999-2001). We introduce a dummy for the 
candidate countries in order to check whether the CEEC-8 show a different relationship 
between nominal and real exchange rate variability.  The dummy is not significant so this does 
not seem to be the case. 
 
Regression statistics with dummy 
 
Dependent Variable: RER 
Included observations: 20 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.44 0.07 6.0 0.00
NER 0.90 0.04 20.6 0.00
DUMMY -0.12 0.07 -1.7 0.10
Adj R2 0.96     F-statistic 216.14
R2 0.96     Prob(F-statistic) 0.00
S.E. of 
regression 
0.15  
 
 
 
 
 
Re-estimating the regression without the dummy led to very similar results: 
 
nerrer 90.039.0 +=  
         (19.66) 
 
In order to check whether the relationship between the real and nominal exchange-rate 
variability is robust we introduced a number of variables in the regression. The standard OCA 
theory would suggest that countries which are more structurally similar would need less real 
exchange rate adjustments. However, both measures of structural similarity we used (intra-
industry trade and trade similarity) are not statistically significant when included in the 
regression.  
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As can be expected, the measure of (relative) price level variability is related to the variability 
of real exchange rates. Once this variable is introduced in the regression the dummy variable 
for the candidate countries becomes significant, but remains negative. This means that the 
candidate countries have in fact somewhat lower variability than one would expect given the 
fluctuations in nominal exchange rates and relative price levels. The coefficient attached to the 
variability of the nominal exchange rates remains approximately the same. 
 
807.047.089.015.0 CEECdummycpinerrer −++=  
         (43.69)  (7,89)    (-2.18) 
 
Regression statistics with relative price level variability and dummy 
Dependent Variable: RER 
Included observations: 20 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 0.15 0.05 2.98 0.01
NER 0.89 0.02 43.69 0.00
CPI 0.47 0.06 7.89 0.00
DUMMY -0.07 0.03 -2.18 0.04
R-squared 0.99     F-statistic 684.19
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.99     Prob(F-statistic) 0.00
S.E. of 
regression 
0.07  
 
The adjusted R2 values from all the regressions show a strong cross-sectional relationship 
between the real and the nominal exchange rate variability. The strong correlation between the 
nominal and the real exchange rate variability can be seen also from the Table 3 below 
containing the correlation coefficients between the bilateral nominal and real exchange rate and 
the relative CPI. 
 
Table 3: Correlation coefficients between changes in bilateral nominal and real exchange 
rates and relative CPI 
Monthly Quarterly  
RER-NER RER-CPI NER-CPI RER-NER RER-CPI NER-CPI
CEEC-8 (1999-2001) 
Czech Republic 92 46 7 99 25 9 
Estonia  100   100  
Hungary 91 40 -2 73 63 -7 
Lithuania 98 -6 -25 99 23 8 
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Latvia 96 21 -7 96 39 13 
Poland 98 16 -3 98 30 10 
Slovenia 64 70 -10 56 63 -29 
Slovakia 75 74 11 78 83 29 
Club Med (1990-1992) 
Greece 36 83 -21 65 67 -12 
Italy 98 27 8 98 46 28 
Spain 94 42 10 98 38 18 
Portugal 92 61 24 95 79 56 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
One measure of whether the candidate countries in Central Europe should join the euro is the 
degree of real exchange rate variability they are experiencing at present.  If it is high one could 
argue that they ‘need’ still some exchange rate flexibility to absorb asymmetric shocks.  Based 
on the data for eight most advanced candidate countries we can conclude that the real and 
nominal exchange rate of the currencies in CEEC-s behaves in the same way as the one of Club 
Med countries during the early 1990s which were found ready to join the euro as part of the 
initial group. The candidate countries have already now even a lower degree of exchange rate 
variability (after taking into account the different degree of nominal variability) than the ‘Club 
Med’. Our results also suggest that the still remaining variability of real exchange rates in 
Central Europe might be mostly due to the fact that nominal exchange rates are still a source of 
shocks.  Moreover, the traditional OCA criteria, e.g. trade structure, do not seem to be related 
to real exchange rate variability.  This reinforces the argument that there is little concrete 
evidence that the candidate countries would need to undergo a lengthy period of real 
convergence before they should join the euro. Naturally, one cannot exclude that in the future 
the candidate countries might suffer from asymmetric shocks. However, their current 
experience has so far indicated that despite still ongoing structural changes the variability of 
their real exchange rates has been surprisingly low. 
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Appendix: Exchange rate variability (individual countries) 
Candidate Countries - exchange rate vatiability vis-à-vis ECU/EURO 
Monthly Quarterly 
RER      NER HIPC RER NER HIPC
96-98 99-01      96-98 99-01 96-98 99-01 96-98 99-01 96-98 99-01 96-98 99-01
Czech Republic 2.4 1.5 2.2 1.3 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.1 
Estonia 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.2 
Hungary 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.5 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.4 
Lithuania 2.1 2.4 1.8 2.5 0.7 0.5 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.2 
Latvia 1.2 1.8 1.0 1.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.3 
Poland 2.0 2.7 1.7 2.6 0.7 0.5 1.1 1.4 0.8 1.4 0.5 0.2 
Slovenia 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Slovakia 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.2 0.4 1.1 0.6 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.8 
Average 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.3 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.3 
Weighted average 1.8 2.0 1.5 1.8 0.8 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.3 
Club Med – exchange rate vatiability vis-à-vis DEM 
Monthly Quarterly 
RER      NER HIPC RER NER HIPC
90-92 93-95      90-92 93-95 90-92 93-95 90-92 93-95 90-92 93-95 90-92 93-95
Greece 1.6 1.5 0.9 1 1.5 1.3 0.9 1.2 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Italy 2.1 2.9 1.9 2.8 0.4 0.4 1.7 2.3 1.5 2.3 0.3 0.2 
Spain 1.9 2.4 1.8 2.4 0.6 0.3 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.2 0.3 0.2 
Portugal 1.6 2.1 1.3 2.1 0.6 0.3 1.3 1.1 1 1.1 0.5 0.3 
Average 1.8 2.2 1.5 2.1 0.9 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.3 0.5 0.3 
Weighted average 2.0 2.6 1.8 2.6 0.5 0.4 1.6 1.9 1.4 1.8 0.3 0.2 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data for CEESs and IMF, International Financial Statistics for Club Med 
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